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In Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, the US. Supreme Court took a
narrow view of the preemptive effect of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act. Lower courts had previously read FIFRA to preempt virtually
all state tort liability for inadequate labeling and failure to warn. As a result,
pesticide manufacturers enjoyed years of virtually no liability for the injuries
caused by their products. This Comment supports the holding of Bates. Unlike
an earlier labeling statute for cigarettes, FIFRA confronted a heterogeneous
and dynamic product market. In such a market, a decentralized state tort
regime provides the best regulatory structure. The prophylactic effect offederal
preemption in such areas results in grievous externalities that outweigh the
social costs of litigation. Hence, the policy rationales underlying the Bates
decision counsel careful consideration when using federal preemption as a
general method of tort reform.
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Introduction
In April 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC,1 overturning thirteen years of precedent during which
pesticide companies enjoyed relative immunity from tort liability. Before
Bates, victims who suffered property damage and bodily harm from pesticides
had no legal recourse, despite compelling claims of product misrepresentation
and inadequate warning labels. This state of affairs stemmed from the dominant
judicial interpretation of the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA).2
Under FIFRA, a pesticide company that seeks to market its product
submits a proposed label and supporting data to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA).3 The EPA then registers the product if it determines that the
chemical does not unreasonably endanger humans or the environment,4 and that
the product label is not false, misleading, or lacking adequate instructions or
warnings. 5 Finally, § 136v(b) of FIFRA provides the pivotal language
articulating the Act's preemptive effects, declaring that no state shall "impose
or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to
or different from those required under this subchapter."
6
Before Bates, U.S. courts interpreted the latter provision to bar tort claims
that, if successful, might induce pesticide companies to change their warning
labels. This reading of FIFRA proceeded from the 1992 Supreme Court
decision Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.7 Cipollone held that the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 8 preempted not only state law that
differed from federal cigarette labeling requirements, but also common-law
duties imposed by courts that differed fiom federal standards. 9 The Court
reasoned that, although the imposition of common-law duties might not
explicitly require cigarette companies to change their labels, judgments might
still indirectly compel companies to make such changes.10 Through analogous
reasoning, lower courts also broadened FIFRA's preemptive effect, and as a
result a staggering number of tort claims were summarily dismissed: Since
1 125 S. Ct. 1788 (2005).
2 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (2000).
3 Id. § 136a(c)(I)(C), (F).
4 Id. §§ 136(bb), 136a(c)(5)(C), 136a(c)(5)(D).
5 Id. § 136(q)(1)(A), (F), (G).
6 Id § 136v(b).
7 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (2000).
9 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521-24.
10 Id
Vol. 23:299, 2006
Pesticides, Preemption, and the Return of Tort Protection
1990, only three suits against pesticide companies filed by farmers prevailed
while 100 failed. 11
Bates finally brought this confounding practice to an end, but the saga of
FIFRA preemption should not be forgotten. Rather, the experience provides
insight and direction regarding the use of preemption as a method of tort
reform. Many commentators view federal, administrative, and even corporate
models of preemption as a means to remove tort claims from courtrooms to
more efficient, specialized institutions with standard review procedures.'
2
However, the draconian results of FIFRA preemption reveal the potential
danger of these proposals if they are not carefully constructed by policymakers
and properly comprehended by the implementing body. The FIFRA saga
ultimately delineates several guiding principles to consider when using
preemption to limit the economic waste associated with excessive tort
litigation.
I. The Preemption Doctrine and FIFRA
The preemption doctrine finds textual basis in the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution, which declares that all courts are bound to follow federal law,
"laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."'' 3 Over the years, courts
have refined preemption to a more precise articulation. In particular,
sovereignty considerations have led courts to presume against federal
preemption unless it is shown to be "the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress" in passing a federal law.' 4 Congress's intent to preempt may be
expressly stated on the face of a federal law' 5 or it may be implied in two ways.
First, preemption by implication can occur when the scope of a federal law
covers the entire area that a state law regulates. 16 Second, implied preemption
can result when federal and state regulations are actually in conflict; that is,
when state law either frustrates the purpose of federal law, or state and federal
laws are such that an actor cannot comply with both simultaneously.'
7
The first case to address whether FIFRA preempted state-tort claims was
Ferebee v. Chevron Chemical Co. 8 In 1984, the family and estate of anagricultural worker brought a suit against Chevron, alleging that the defendant
II H. Bishop Dansby, Bates v. Dow Agrosciences: U.S. Supreme Court Restores Sanity in
Products Liability Law, PESTICIDES & YOU, Summer 2005, at 9, 10-11, available at
http://www.beyondpesticides.org/infoservices/pesticidesandyou/Summer 05 vol. 25 no. 2.pdf.
12 See, e.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis,
97 YALE L.J. 353, 388-91 (1988) (arguing that agencies are better equipped to create and interpret
regulations than are courts and juries).
13 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
14 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
15 Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190,
203 (1983).
16 La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 368 (1986).
17 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
18 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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negligently failed to warn that prolonged exposure to its herbicide could result
in pulmonary fibrosis.' 9 The trial court found for the plaintiff, but on appeal
Chevron argued that failure-to-warn claims were preempted by § 136v(b) of
FIFRA. Responding to this argument, the court of appeals held that the
provision did not expressly preempt common-law judgments. 2' Moreover, in
regard to implied preemption, the court found that common-law judgments did
not prevent pesticide companies from complying with EPA requirements. The
court explained that companies retained a choice either to modify their labels in
response to adverse judgments or to do nothing and risk future law suits.
22
Other courts disagreed with the "choice of reaction" theory. In the 1987
case Fitzgerald v. Mallinckrodt, Inc.,23 a greenskeeper alleged that a chemical
manufacturer failed to warn that prolonged exposure to its fungicide could
24result in mercury poisoning. The district court granted summary judgment for
the defendant, explaining that the plaintiffs claim was expressly preempted by
FIFRA. 25 The plaintiff argued that the "choice of reaction" theory urged against
preemption, but the court found that "the damages awarded and verdict
rendered.., can be viewed as state regulation: the decision effectively compels
the manufacturer to alter its warning."
2 6
The conflicting Ferebee and Fitzgerald decisions made failure-to-warn
claims against pesticide companies an uncertain undertaking. From 1987 to
1992, state and federal courts were divided on the preemption issue, 27 and it
was not until the Supreme Court decided Cipollone that courts began to
adjudicate FIFRA cases uniformly.
II. The Impact of Cipollone
The 1992 Cipollone decision summarily dashed the legitimacy of the
"choice of reaction" theory. In Cipollone, the plaintiff sued a group of cigarette
manufacturers claiming, inter alia, that the manufacturers failed to sufficiently
19 Id. at 1533. Pulmonary fibrosis is the scarring of the lungs resulting in the irreversible loss
of the tissue's ability to transfer oxygen into the bloodstream. What is Pulmonary Fibrosis?,
http://www.pulmonaryfibrosis.org/ipf.htm (last updated Mar. 15, 2005).
20 Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1540.
21 Id. at 1542.
22 The court explained what became known as the "choice of reaction" theory by saying that
compliance with both federal and state law cannot be said to be impossible: Chevron can
continue to use the EPA-approved label and can at the same time pay damages to successful
tort plaintiffs such as Mr. Ferebee; alternatively, Chevron can petition the EPA to allow the
label to be made more comprehensive.
Id.
23 681 F. Supp. 404 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
24 Id. at 405.
25 Id. at 408.
26 Id. at 407 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc.. 825 F.2d 620, 627
(1st Cir. 1987)).
27 See William T. Smith, III & Kathryn M. Coonrod, Cipollone's Effect on FIFRA
Preemption, 61 UMKC L. REV. 489,499 & n.61 (1993).
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warn that their product caused cancer.28 However, the Supreme Court held that
this claim was preempted by the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act, a federal statute providing that "[n]o requirement or prohibition based on
smoking and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the
advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this chapter." 29 The Court interpreted
"requirement or prohibition" to include judgments based on state common-law
rules, explaining that "[t]he obligation to pay compensation can be ... a potent
method of governing conduct and controlling policy.' '30 As a result, lower
courts began to interpret the "requirements" language of FIFRA as a restriction
sweeping similarly broadly.
The adoption of this expansive view of FIFRA preemption sounded the
death knell for pesticide claimants and promised almost complete tort immunity
to pesticide companies. As Smith and Coonrod explain, products liability
claims against pesticides are "peculiarly dependent on failure to warn" and
similar theories. 3 1 Design defect claims against a notoriously dangerous product
are unlikely to garner much sympathy from a jury, but juries are still likely to
"understand and sympathize with an injured plaintiff's plea that he would not
have used the product as he did if he had only understood the risks or been told
how to properly use it."32 Thus, when courts finally closed the door on failure-
to-warn and misrepresentation claims, they effectively stamped out liability for
pesticide companies altogether. Surprisingly, courts maintained this posture
notwithstanding amicus curiae briefs submitted by the EPA, the agency
administering FIFRA, on behalf of plaintiffs.33 Law review articles frequently
chastised courts for their stubborn adherence to a doctrine that transformed
FIFRA's warning label requirement-a device that should protect consumers-
into a method by which pesticide companies could avoid compensating
victims. 34 Over a decade would pass until these criticisms would be
acknowledged.
28 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 508 (1992).
29 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2000).
30 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S.
236, 247 (1959)).
31 Smith & Coonrod, supra note 27, at 495.
32 Id. at 496.
33 See, e.g., Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir. 2002); Etcheverry v.
Tri-Ag Service, Inc., 993 P.2d 366, 374 (Cal. 2000).
34 See, e.g., Joseph T. Carter, Papas v. Upjohn Co. - The Possibility That FIFRA Might
Preempt State Common-Law Tort Claims Should Be Exterminated, 45 ARK. L. REV. 729 (1992); James
M. Graves, Ciba-Geigy Corporation v. Alter: Federal Preemption, FIFRA, and Compensatory Damages
in Arkansas, 48 ARK. L. REV. 577 (1995); Robert Waltz, Environmental Protection and Pre-Emption of
State Common Law Tort Claims by FIFRA: Netland v. Hess, 11 SOUTHEASTERN ENVTL. L.J. 109
(2002).
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III. Bates and the Return of Tort Protection
In April 2005, the Supreme Court finally recast FIFRA preemption with
the Bates decision. A group of Texas farmers sued Dow Agrosciences over an
herbicide named Strongarm that damaged their peanut crops. 35 The plaintiffs
alleged, inter alia, that the Strongarm product label failed to indicate that in soil
with a pH level of 7.2 or higher, the chemical not only failed to prevent weeds
but also damaged crops.36 Dow Agrosciences raised an affirmative defense of
FIFRA preemption, and the district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment, which was then affirmed by the court of appeals. 37 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to finally delineate the nature of FIFRA's
preemption provision.
38
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, first affirmed the application of
the central holding in Cipollone, finding that the "requirements" language of
FIFRA pertained not only to positive statutory requirements, but also to
common-law duties. 39 However, Stevens said that lower courts applied this
holding too broadly. In regard to claims for defective design, defective
manufacture, negligent testing, and breach of express warranty, common-law
duties did not specifically implicate any standards for labeling or packaging. °
While it is true that an adverse judgment on these claims might induce a
manufacturer to modify its label, no new labeling requirements were imposed
per se.4 1 However, the Court continued, claims for failure to warn and
misrepresentation exclusively involve common-law requirements for labels and
packaging, and are preempted.42 Still, according to the language of FIFRA,
these claims are preempted only when the common-law requirements are "in
addition to or different from" those imposed by FIFRA;43 an exception which
the Court read very narrowly.
Before Bates, most courts viewed the phrase "in addition to or different
from" as a hair-trigger; suits that could potentially change any aspect of an
EPA-approved label were preempted per se. In contrast, Bates held that "the
state law need not explicitly incorporate FIFRA's standards as an element of a
35 Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 125 S. Ct. 1788, 1792-93 (2005).
36 Id. at 1793.
37 Id.
38 Justice Stevens explained:
[The Fifth Circuit's] decision was consistent with those of a majority of the Courts of Appeals,
as well of several state high courts, but conflicted with the decisions of other courts and with
the views of the EPA set forth in an amicus curiae brief filed with the California Supreme
Court in 2000. We granted certiorari to resolve this conflict.
Id. at 1794 (footnotes omitted).
39 Id. at 1798.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 1798-99.
42 Id. at 1800.
43 Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2000)).
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cause of action in order to survive pre-emption.",44 Rather, the Court endorsed a
'parallel requirements' reading" of FIFRA, permitting any additional statutory
or common-law standards which served FIFRA's primary purpose to prevent
"false or misleading" statements or "inadequate instructions or wamings.
45
The Court offered several justifications for its "parallel requirements
reading." First the Court pointed to the glaring fact that FIFRA provided no
federal remedy to those injured by pesticides violating the Act's labeling
requirements. This fact, in light of "[t]he long history of tort litigation against
manufacturers of poisonous substances," led the Court to conclude that "[i]f
Congress had intended to deprive injured parties of a long available form of
compensation, it surely would have expressed that intent more clearly.
' 6
Furthermore, the Court declared that private claims in state courts would
further the central purpose of FIFRA, which was the protection of consumers
and the environment. Specifically, private claims would provide an incentive
for manufacturers to use the "utmost care in the business of distributing
,47inherently dangerous products. '  Ultimately, while the Court sought to
accomplish the positivist goal of interpreting FIFRA's preemption provision, it
also implicitly articulated normative compensatory and deterrence-based
considerations that shed light on how preemption regimes should function
generally.
IV. The Lessons of the FIFRA Saga
The normative considerations underlying Justice Stevens's opinion permit
an expansive view of the FIFRA saga. Specifically, it is quite possible to view
the decade-long perversion of the Act as a lesson demonstrating the ills of hasty
tort reform. As FIFRA preemption cases began to appear in the early 1980s,
calls for tort reform were escalating throughout the country. Many perceived
the liberalization of tort law during the 1960s and 1970s as producing a
"litigation explosion" accompanied by higher insurance premiums. 48 This
perspective, termed the "jaundiced view" by Professor Marc Galanter,49 had
reached its zenith by the Bates decision and was a prominent topic in the 2004
50U.S. presidential race.
44 Id.
45 Id. (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 136(q)(l)(A), (F), (G) (2000)).
46 Id. at 1801.
47 Id. at 1802.
48 Martha Chamallas, Vanished from the First Year: Lost Torts and Deep Structures in Tort
Law, in CANONS OF LAW 104, 105-06 (Jack Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds., 2000).
49 See Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 717 n.1 (1998).
50 See, e.g., Richard A. Oppel Jr. & Glen Justice, Kerry Gains Campaign Ace, Risking Anti-
Lawyer Anger, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2004, at A15; David G. Savage, Texans Still at Odds over Bush's
Legal Reforms, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 22, 2004, at A1.
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Taken as a whole, Bates and its antecedents reveal several issues to
consider when removing tort claims from courtrooms and standardizing, if not
precluding, their resolution. The Bates decision, while seeming to acknowledge
the prophylactic effect of the Cipollone holding on FIFRA preemption cases,
cautions that a potent preemption regime should not originate through
guesswork; when tort claims are summarily jettisoned from courtrooms,
decision-makers must be confident that policymakers have planned for this
outcome and established appropriate alternative forms of compensation.
Second, Bates implicitly calls upon policymakers to consider the shortcomings
of centralized preemption regimes in informing the actions of parties engaging
in risky activities, particularly when these activities develop and change at
dramatic rates. In such situations, the decentralized tort process is likely to be
superior, and the benefits of this system are likely to outweigh the often
dreaded costs of excessive litigation.
A. Rectifying the Jurisprudence of Tort Preemption
The Bates decision revived the weighty presumption against federal
preemption of state law. In his opinion, Justice Thomas unwittingly exemplifies
the dilution of this tenet, claiming that FIFRA contains "an explicit statement
that FIFRA pre-empts some state-law claims" and therefore "our task is to
determine which state-law claims [FIFRA] pre-empts, without slanting the
inquiry in favor of either the Federal Government or the States. '51 Thomas's
apparent confidence in statutory interpretation is uncommon; not only have
lower courts disagreed over the extent of FIFRA's preemptive effect and the
applicability of the "choice of reaction" theory, many have also come into
52conflict over whether the type of preemption was express or implied . The tort
process, as a well-developed and responsive mechanism to civil wrongs, should
not be brushed aside absent a clear and unambiguous statement on the face of a
federal law. Stevens reaffirms this view, quoting the Court's earlier statement
that "[b]ecause the States are independent sovereigns in our federal system, we
have long presumed that Congress does not cavalierly pre-empt state-law
causes of action. 53
Not only does Bates reinstate a jurisprudential presumption against
preemption, it also points to special circumstances that buttress this
presumption. For example, Stevens' opinion implies that states enjoy a "first-
mover advantage" of sorts in establishing a compensatory regime. That is, in
spheres where states have established a long history of providing remedies,
51 Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1806 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52 See, e.g., Netland v. Hess & Clark, Inc., 284 F.3d 895 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding express
preemption); Papas v. Upjohn Co., 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding implied preemption);
Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (finding neither implied nor express
preemption).
53 Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801 (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
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courts must look to an explicit showing from Congress of its intentions to
interfere,54 dictum which arguably marginalizes the role of implied preemption.
Moreover, where Congress supplants states' authority to compensate victims,
courts should expect Congress to provide federal remedies. To make this point,
Stevens refers to the 1984 Supreme Court decision Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp.55 which held that the Atomic Energy Act, in failing to compensate
persons injured by hazardous nuclear materials, was unlikely to preempt state
common-law awards. In that decision, the Court declared "[i]t is difficult to
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove all means of judicial
recourse for those injured by illegal conduct. '' 56 Ultimately, through his
analysis of FIFRA preemption in the Bates decision, Stevens clarifies and
arguably increases the burden courts must overcome in order to find federal
preemption. As a result, Bates helps to return tort protection to the status quo
before Cipollone.
B. Characteristics of Proper Preemption Regimes
Bates goes beyond articulating to courts a proper approach to finding tort
preemption; the decision also implicitly informs policymakers regarding the
circumstances in which preemption is an appropriate means of tort.reform. The
contrasting outcomes of Bates, a tort preemption case about pesticides, and
Cipollone, an analogous case about cigarettes, encourages policymakers to
consider the nature of the industry targeted by potential preemption regimes.
Characteristics such as the homogeneity of products across an industry and the
likelihood of informational asymmetries indicate the likelihood of success for a
centralized federal regime featuring preemption, rather than continued reliance
on the decentralized tort process.
In Cipollone, the preemptive effect of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act (FCLAA) complied with a rational policy of uniform labeling
requirements and consumer protection. In stark contrast to FIFRA, the federal
law central to the Cipollone holding applies to a single, relatively homogenous
product with a static set of ingredients. Given these characteristics, the federal
government is a capable body to assess the health risks of smoking, establish a
standard warning, and prohibit state interference. The preemptive effect of a
federal act would benefit manufacturers by alleviating the burden of
specializing cigarette packages and labels to comply with a patchwork of state
and local laws.57 Moreover, uniformity would aid consumers by disallowing
confusing modifications of warning standards; cigarette manufacturers could no
54 See supra text accompanying note 46.
55 Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1801; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
56 Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 251.
57 See generally Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 514 (1992) (stating that one
of the purposes of the FCLAA was to "protect[] the national economy from the burden imposed by
diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations").
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longer exploit loopholes in state regulations or common law. Ultimately, the
measures of the FCLAA represent an effective and successful use of
preemption, furthering the goals of economic efficiency and consumer
protection.
Bates helps to illustrate why the market for pesticides, unlike the cigarette
industry, is a poor place to apply preemption. In contrast to the homogenous
market regulated by the FCLAA, FIFRA regulates thousands of pesticide
products with hundreds of active ingredients. 58 The daunting task of regulating
the market explains not only the flexibility given to manufacturers to design
their labels, 59 but also Congress's decision to no longer require companies to
provide data demonstrating the efficacy of their pesticides. 60 This reality stems
from the nature of the market for pesticides: a fast-paced growth market where
innovation and new product development are paramount. 61 In this industry, the
tort process serves as a valuable counterbalance as the profit motive urges
manufacturers to introduce new, potentially harmful products. The Ferebee
court recognized the tort process's valuable role, declaring:
By encouraging plaintiffs to bring suit for injuries not previously recognized as
traceable to pesticides ... a state tort action ... may aid in the exposure of new
dangers associated with pesticides .... In addition, the specter of damage actions
may provide manufacturers with added dynamic incentives to continue to keep
abreast of all possible injuries stemming from use of their product so as to
forestall such actions through product improvement.
62
The preservation of tort protection in the market for pesticides clearly
benefits consumers in that compensation is available for injuries resulting from
pesticide manufacturers. Furthermore, pesticide manufacturers benefit from the
tort process as well, since it provides rapid feedback regarding adequate
product warnings and instructions. Arguably, Dow Agrosciences preserved
substantial goodwill through discovering the harmful interaction between
Strongarm and alkaline soil before marketing the product outside of Texas, or
before the company used Strongarm's active ingredient in future products.
58 See Riden v. ICI Americas, Inc., 763 F. Supp. 1500, 1508 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (citing U.S.
GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RCED-86-125, PESTICIDES: EPA'S FORMIDABLE TASK TO ASSESS AND
REGULATE THEIR RISKS 10 (1986)).
59 See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(C), (F) (2000).
60 The Court noted:
In 1978, Congress once again amended FIFRA . . . in response to EPA's concern that its
evaluation of pesticide efficacy during the registration process diverted too many resources
from its task of assessing the environmental and health dangers posed by pesticides. Congress
addressed this problem by authorizing EPA to waive data requirements pertaining to efficacy,
thus permitting the agency to register a pesticide without confirming the efficacy claims made
on its label.
Bates, 125 S. Ct. at 1796 (citation omitted).
61 See U.S. ENv'L PROT. AGENCY, EPA-735-R-05-001, TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS:
PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT, EPA'S PESTICIDE PROGRAM FY 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT 5 (2004), available at http://www.epa.gov/oppfeadl/annual/2004/04annualrpt.pdf (showing the
rapid rate of new antimicrobial, conventional, and biological active ingredient registrations).
62 Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541-42 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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Some may criticize this deference to the tort process, believing that the
standard-of-living benefits gained from pesticides will be stamped out by the
imposition of "crushing liability." These arguments, incorporating Horwitz's
relation between liability standards and economic growth,63 drip of the classic
liability fallacy-a perspective which effectively ignores the ability to
internalize social costs. Instead, efficiency is achieved when pesticide
companies factor in the social costs of their products, and a flexible, diffuse tort
process is an excellent way to reveal these social costs. In fast-paced markets
similar to that for pesticides, the tort process-not preemption-ultimately
yields greater social efficiency.
V. Conclusion
Although Bates demystified the preemptive nature of FIFRA, it remains
unclear whether FIFRA now stands as Congress intended. As the Supreme
Court remarked, examination of the Act's legislative history "is at best
ambiguous. '64 Nonetheless, the current interpretation of FIFRA's preemptive
effects is likely the most promising for society at large. After the Cipollone
decision and its unfortunate application to claims against pesticide companies,
victims of negligence went uncompensated while manufacturers produced
under distorted market pressures, delivering pesticides to consumers without an
accurate ascertainment of the products' social costs. To avoid similar pitfalls
with preemption regimes in the future, Bates urges that courts must stay the
hand of preemption unless given a nearly explicit mandate by the enabling
statute, and policymakers must carefully and completely consider the nature of
the claims and alternative forms of compensation when applying preemption as
a means of prophylactic tort reform. As commentator H. Bishop Dansby
argues, lawmakers must recognize the tort process's "traditional role of
responding to societal needs in a complex, rapacious, and competitive world."65
Granted, discouraging frivolous lawsuits and reducing economic waste are
noble goals of tort reform, and in some cases preemption can serve these goals
effectively. However, before a policy of preemption is put in place, careful
measures must be taken to "get the bugs out."
63 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 99-
101 (1977). "One of the most striking aspects of legal change during the antebellum period is the extent
to which common-law doctrines were transformed to create immunities from legal liability and thereby
to provide substantial subsidies for those who undertook schemes of economic development." Id. at 99-
100.
64 Wisconsin Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 609 (1991).
65 Dansby, supra note 11, at 11.

